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A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander F. Tieman

    (Tinbergen Institute & Free University, Amsterdam)

  • Harold Houba

    (Free University, Amsterdam)

Abstract

The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) when the latter model's (fixed) mutation rate is equal to the expected mutation rate. A small population result corrects a minor omission in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993).

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba, 1998. "A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9809002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9809002 Note: Type of Document - TeX (Scientific Workplace 2.5); prepared on COMPAQ PC; to print on HP Laserjet IV; pages: 14 ; figures: included
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    2. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 29-56.
    5. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 943-956.
    6. Rhode, Paul & Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 443-449, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    varying mutation rate; risk dominance; coordination games;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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