My bibliography  Save this paper

# An Evolutionary Bargaining Model

## Author

Listed:
• Murali Agastya

(University College London, London)

## Abstract

Varying quantities of a single good can be produced using at least two and at most $n$ factors of production. The problem of allocating the surplus among the factors is studied in a dynamic model with adaptive behavior. Representatives for the factors (called players) make wage demands based on precedent and ignorant of each other's utilities for this good. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which the long-run equilibria coincide with the core allocations. A global convergence result is proved to show that players do learn to reach a core allocation in the long run. Moreover, allowing for the possibility of mistakes by the players, all the {\em stochastically stable outcomes} are characterized. The main result shows that in the limit, these stable allocations for a particular set of players converges to the allocation that maximizes the product of all the players' utilities over all core allocations.

## Suggested Citation

• Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, EconWPA.
• Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503001 Note: LaTeX ascii file. Latex it twice to get cross references right.
as

File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9503/9503001.pdf

File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9503/9503001.tex

File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/game/papers/9503/9503001.ps.gz

## References listed on IDEAS

as
1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
2. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
3. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
4. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
6. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
7. Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-1496, September.
8. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as

Cited by:

1. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
2. Murali Agastya, 1995. "Perseverance, Information and Stochastically Stable Outcomes," Game Theory and Information 9503002, EconWPA.

### JEL classification:

• C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
• D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

## Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9503001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.