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Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention

Author

Listed:
  • David Hirshleifer

    (Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University)

  • SONYA SEONGYEON LIM

    (DePaul University)

  • Siew Hong Teoh

    (Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University)

Abstract

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce observers' belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas.

Suggested Citation

  • David Hirshleifer & SONYA SEONGYEON LIM & Siew Hong Teoh, 2004. "Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention," Game Theory and Information 0412002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yuan, Yu, 2015. "Market-wide attention, trading, and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 548-564.
    2. David Hirshleifer & Sonya Seongyeon Lim & Siew Hong Teoh, 2009. "Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2289-2325, October.
    3. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning," Working Papers 479, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2005. "Attention, Demographics, and the Stock Market," NBER Working Papers 11211, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2009. "Capital Budgeting vs. Market Timing: An Evaluation Using Demographics," NBER Working Papers 15184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Vincze, János, 2010. "Miért és mitől védjük a fogyasztókat?. Aszimmetrikus információ és/vagy korlátozott racionalitás [Asymmetric information and/or bounded rationality: why are consumers protected and from what?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 725-752.
    7. Hsu, Ching-Chi & Chen, Miao-Ling, 2018. "Timing of advertising and the MAX effect," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 105-114.
    8. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    9. Stefano DellaVigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2007. "Demographics and Industry Returns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1667-1702, December.
    10. Feng Dong, 0. "Noise-driven abnormal institutional investor attention," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 0, pages 1-22.
    11. Yin, Libo & Feng, Jiabao, 2019. "Can investors attention on oil markets predict stock returns?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 786-800.
    12. David Hirshleifer & Sonya S. Lim & Siew Hong Teoh, 2011. "Limited Investor Attention and Stock Market Misreactions to Accounting Information," Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 35-73.
    13. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2020. "Persuasion Through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4958-4979, November.
    15. Feng Dong, 2020. "Noise-driven abnormal institutional investor attention," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(5), pages 467-488, September.
    16. Lou, Dong, 2013. "Attracting investor attention through advertising," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54382, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2005. "Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000480, UCLA Department of Economics.
    18. Elizabeth Blankespoor, 2019. "The Impact of Information Processing Costs on Firm Disclosure Choice: Evidence from the XBRL Mandate," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 919-967, September.
    19. Mark Bagnoli & Stanley Levine & Susan G. Watts, 2005. "Analyst estimation revision clusters and corporate events, Part II," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-393, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure policy; disclosure regulation; limited attention; behavioral economics; behavioral accounting; behavioral finance; market efficiency; psychology and economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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