The Structural Dynamics of Corruption: Artificial Society Approach
Corruption has been an important issue as it becomes obstacle to achieve the better and more efficient economic governmental system. The paper defines corruption in two ways, as state capture and administrative corruption to grasp the quintessence of the corruption cases modeled in dynamical computational social system. The result of experiments through simulation is provided in order to construct an understanding of structural properties of corruption, giving way to consider corruption not as an isolated phenomenon, but conclusively, as an interdisciplinary problem and should be handled in holistic perspectives.
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