Adaptive Governance: The Role of Loyalty
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- Gerard Weisbuch & Alan Kirman & Dorothea Herreiner, 1995. "Market Organization," Working Papers 95-11-102, Santa Fe Institute.
- Tomas Klos, "undated".
"Decentralized Interaction and Co-adaptation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
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- Klos, Tomas B., 1997. "Decentralized interaction and co-adaptation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Research Report 97B33, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-261, October.
- Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
- Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-371, May.
- repec:dgr:rugsom:97b33 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:mes:jeciss:v:30:y:1996:i:4:p:1212-1216 is not listed on IDEAS
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KeywordsTransaction costs; governance; loyalty; artificial adaptive agents;
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