On the Design of Public Infrastructure procurements
Public procurement of infrastructure has been subject to a long standing debate concerning the procurements' qualification requirements. Basically, it remains unclear what determines public procurement officers to vary procurements' qualification requirements. This research serves to elaborate on public procurements' procedure design. The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of why contracting authorities choose specific requirements prior to public procurement. What determines variation in public procurements' qualification requirements? For this the procurements' procedure design is modelled as a rational choice among a set of alternatives within a random utility framework. Qualification requirements are chosen as to maximize utility of the procurements' officer. In the empirical part of the paper the procurements' procedure design is modelled as a limited dependent variable model. The data comes from the EIB Monitor Procurements covering public procurements in the Netherlands, and relates to public open procurements of civil work posted by municipalities in the first half of 2009. The model results indicate that requirements do relate to degree of professionalism of the procurement office and to the type of work. These results indicate a rational choice among qualification requirements yet explain about 15 percent of total variation, suggesting other factors at work. Keywords: Construction industry, infrastructure, Bidding, Public Procurement Auctions, municipalities
|Date of creation:||Sep 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ersa.org
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Train,Kenneth E., 2009.
"Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521766555, October.
- Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions,"
- De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2008.
"Procurement efficiency for infrastructure development and financial needs reassessed,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4662, The World Bank.
- Antonio Estache & A. Iimi, 2008. "Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed," Working Papers ECARES 2008_022, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003.
"Deciding Between Competition and Collusion,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
- Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 295-316, 09.
- Gaver, Kenneth M & Zimmerman, Jerold L, 1977. "An Analysis of Competitive Bidding on BART Contracts," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(3), pages 279-95, July.
- Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009.
"Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4853, The World Bank.
- Antonio Estache & A. Iimi, 2009. "Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds: Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement," Working Papers ECARES 2009_006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p1060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gunther Maier)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.