Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
Allowing for a reserve price in a dynamic auction with capacity-constrained bidders changes the equilibrium in an unexpected way. The distribution of winning bids contains a mass point; several bidder types "bunch" at the reserve price.
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