IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/randje/v51y2020i3p805-839.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A computational framework for analyzing dynamic auctions: The market impact of information sharing

Author

Listed:
  • John Asker
  • Chaim Fershtman
  • Jihye Jeon
  • Ariel Pakes

Abstract

This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically important data, need not be welfare reducing. Our methodological contribution is to show how to adapt the experience‐based equilibrium concept to a dynamic auction environment and to provide an implementable boundary‐consistency condition that mitigates the extent of multiple equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • John Asker & Chaim Fershtman & Jihye Jeon & Ariel Pakes, 2020. "A computational framework for analyzing dynamic auctions: The market impact of information sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 805-839, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:3:p:805-839
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12341
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12341
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1756-2171.12341?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Ericson & Ariel Pakes, 1995. "Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(1), pages 53-82.
    2. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    3. John Asker, 2010. "A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 724-762, June.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    5. Martin Pesendorfer & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2003. "Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games," NBER Working Papers 9726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2020. "Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2558-2585, August.
    7. Joachim R. Groeger, 2014. "A Study Of Participation In Dynamic Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1129-1154, November.
    8. Ben Mermelstein & Volker Nocke & Mark A. Satterthwaite & Michael D. Whinston, 2020. "Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies: A Computational Model of Optimal Merger Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 301-341.
    9. Alessandro Bonatti & Gonzalo Cisternas & Juuso Toikka, 2017. "Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 503-546.
    10. Viplav Saini, 2012. "Endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(4), pages 726-760, December.
    11. Maura P. Doyle & Christopher M. Snyder, 1999. "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1326-1364, December.
    12. Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring.
    13. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
    14. Mireia Jofre-Bonet & Martin Pesendorfer, 2003. "Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(5), pages 1443-1489, September.
    15. Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
    16. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
    17. Richard N. Clarke, 1983. "Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 383-394, Autumn.
    18. David Besanko & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav Kryukov, 2014. "The Economics of Predation: What Drives Pricing When There Is Learning-by-Doing?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 868-897, March.
    19. Przemyslaw Jeziorski & Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2016. "Dynamic auction environment with subcontracting," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 751-791, November.
    20. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    21. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
    22. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
    23. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    24. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 433-446.
    25. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
    26. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
    27. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2012. "Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1611-1661.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Choe, Chongwoo & Matsushima, Noriaki & Tremblay, Mark J., 2022. "Behavior-based personalized pricing: When firms can share customer information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    2. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer, 2021. "Equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic games: testing and estimation," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series 618, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    3. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer, 2023. "Equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic games: Testing and estimation," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 26(1), pages 26-42.
    4. John Asker & Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design," NBER Working Papers 28535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. John Asker & Chaim Fershtman & Jihye Jeon & Ariel Pakes, 2016. "The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing," NBER Working Papers 22836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Wang, Hong, 2017. "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 48-59.
    3. Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023. "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies 1014, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2023.
    4. Kei Kawai & Jun Nakabayashi & Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2023. "Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(1), pages 376-403.
    5. Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions," MPRA Paper 55079, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
    7. Martin Huber & David Imhof & Rieko Ishii, 2022. "Transnational machine learning with screens for flagging bid‐rigging cartels," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 185(3), pages 1074-1114, July.
    8. Jean-François Richard, 2019. "Bidder Collusion: Accounting for All Feasible Bidders," Working Paper 6759, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    9. Victor Aguirregabiria & Margaret Slade, 2017. "Empirical models of firms and industries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1445-1488, December.
    10. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    11. Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2007. "Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 383-396, May.
    12. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    14. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
    15. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2008. "Bidding rings and the winner's curse," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1018-1041, December.
    16. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
    17. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Omer Biran, 2013. "Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 117-136, July.
    19. Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Jean-Fran�ois Gauthier & Art Shneyerov, 2018. "Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 301-363.
    20. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083318, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:3:p:805-839. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/randdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.