IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wis/wpaper/1503.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Heterogeneous preferences, atmospheric externalities, and environmental taxation

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelo Arbex

    () (Department of Economics, University of Windsor)

  • Christian Trudeau

    () (Department of Economics, University of Windsor)

Abstract

We model a federation of two jurisdictions where agents value consumption vs. nature differently. Consumption obtained through pollution-inducing production also generate a negative externality on neighbors. When regions are heterogeneous, we show that even with a decentralized policy we can obtain first-best efficiency by choosing a combination of pollution taxes in both regions and lump-sum transfers. We show that optimal pollution taxes are determined only by the externality parameters. For Cobb-Douglas preferences, the optimal transfer also depend on the initial stocks of nature, but not on preference parameters. Numerically we explore further the relationship among preferences for consumption versus nature, pollution externality and government policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Arbex & Christian Trudeau, 2015. "Heterogeneous preferences, atmospheric externalities, and environmental taxation," Working Papers 1503, University of Windsor, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:wis:wpaper:1503
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1503.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2015
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marcus Berliant & Shin-Kun Peng & Ping Wang, 2014. "Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 665-704, April.
    2. Fell, Harrison & Kaffine, Daniel T., 2014. "Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 46-53.
    3. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    4. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1206-1217.
    5. DAUBANES Julien & GRIMAUD André, 2006. "On the North-South Effects of Environmental Policy: Rent Transfers, Relocation and Growth," LERNA Working Papers 06.26.219, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    6. Williams, Roberton III, 2002. "Environmental Tax Interactions when Pollution Affects Health or Productivity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 261-270, September.
    7. Douglas Lundin, 2001. "Welfare-Improving Carbon Dioxide Tax Reform Taking Externality and Location into Account," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 815-835, November.
    8. Thomas H. Tietenberg, 1980. "Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(4), pages 391-416.
    9. Katrin Millock & Céline Nauges, 2006. "Ex Post Evaluation of an Earmarked Tax on Air Pollution," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(1), pages 68-84.
    10. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Caplan, Arthur J., 1997. "Transboundary Pollution Control in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 173-186, October.
    11. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 333-354.
    12. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, November.
    13. Benjamin Jones & Michael Keen & Jon Strand, 2013. "Fiscal implications of climate change," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(1), pages 29-70, February.
    14. Jesse Schwartz & Robert Repetto, 2000. "Nonseparable Utility and the Double Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction Effect," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 149-157.
    15. Williams III, Roberton C., 2003. "Health effects and optimal environmental taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 323-335.
    16. Julien Daubanes & André Grimaud, 2010. "Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 567-588.
    17. Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2013. "Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 783-796.
    18. Nicholas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelsohn, 2009. "Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1714-1739, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities; environmental preferences; optimal taxation.;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wis:wpaper:1503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Trudeau). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dwindca.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.