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Taxing Hard-to-Tax Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelo Arbex

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor)

  • Enlinson Mattos

    (São Paulo School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation)

  • Laudo M. Ogura

    (Economics Department, Grand Valley State University)

Abstract

Tax enforcement costs constrain the government?s ability to observe economic transactions, giving rise to hard-to-tax (HTT) markets. In these markets transactions are untaxed and consumers are better off than in taxed markets. This paper studies a novel approach to combat evasion in HTT markets: consumer auditing, which rewards consumers for requesting transaction receipts. We develop a Hotelling-type spatial model of sales taxation to analyze the welfare and distributional effects of the implementation of this policy. We find that consumer auditing allows for a lower tax rate and greater provision of the public good in the economy. We show that this policy not only can enhance welfare, but also equalize utilities of consumers across markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos & Laudo M. Ogura, 2013. "Taxing Hard-to-Tax Markets," Working Papers 1305, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wis:wpaper:1305
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carla Marchese, 2009. "Rewarding the Consumer for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(4), pages 383-402, December.
    2. Gordon, Roger & Li, Wei, 2009. "Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 855-866, August.
    3. Das-Gupta, Arindam, 1994. "A Theory of Hard-to-Tax Groups," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 28-39.
    4. Juin-jen Chang & Ching-chong Lai, 2004. "Collaborative tax evasion and social norms: why deterrence does not work," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 344-368, April.
    5. James Alm and Joege Martinez Vazquez, 2003. ""Sizing" the problem of the Hard-to-Tax," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0321, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Redistributive Taxation under Ethical Behaviour," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 505-529, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laudo M Ogura, 2018. "Informality and exogenous regulations in regional economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 892-900.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation; hard-to-tax; tax evasion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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