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Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in Late Imperial Russia

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Abstract

We investigate the financing of corporations in industrialization's early stages. A new balance sheet database featuring all Imperial Russian corporations in 1914 suggests that Russian corporations exhibited considerable financial flexibility. We emphasize financing differences between two types of Russian corporations: share partnerships and A-corporations. Share partnerships issued greater dividends as a proportion of share capital or profits, were less likely to issue bonds, and had larger accounts payable. Financial strategies varied with age, size, and sector in a manner consistent with modern corporate finance theories. This optimistic assessment suggests that absence of low-cost incorporation impeded Russian industrial and economic development.

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  • Amanda Gregg & Steven Nafziger, 2016. "Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in Late Imperial Russia," Department of Economics Working Papers 2016-12, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    • Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2016-12
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gregg, Amanda & Nafziger, Steven, 2020. "Financing nascent industry: Leverage, politics, and performance in Imperial Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    3. Gregg, Amanda & Nafziger, Steven, 2020. "Financing nascent industry: Leverage, politics, and performance in Imperial Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2020, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    4. Emilie Bonhoure, 2021. "An Original Solution to Agency Issues Among PreWWI Paris-Listed Firms : The Statutory Rule of Profit Allocation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03107869, HAL.
    5. Tomohiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in Plant Lifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIGS Working Paper Series 19-006E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
    6. Emilie Bonhoure, 2021. "An Original Solution to Agency Issues Among PreWWI Paris-Listed Firms : The Statutory Rule of Profit Allocation," Working Papers halshs-03107869, HAL.
    7. Tomihiro Machikita & Tetsuji Okazaki, 2019. "Transition to a Modern Regime and Change in PlantLifecycles: A Natural Experiment from Meiji Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1122, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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