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The origins and evolution of antidumping regulation


  • Finger, J. Michael


Antidumping has about it the aura of a special measure to undo a special problem. Within this view, the explosion of antidumping actions in the 1980s was simply a good thing carried too far: the appropriate remedy to the current popularity of antidumping is to return it to its traditional and proper scope. It is hard, however, to find the basis for this view in the history of antidumping regulation. There is little in that history to suggest that anitdumping ever had a scope more particular than protecting home producers from import competition, and there is much to suggest that such protection was its intended scope. The thesis of this paper, then, is that antidumping has been from its beginning, part of the rhetoric and part of the mechanics of ordinary protection. Antidumping is where the protectionist action is today because it has proved to be broad and flexible enough to handle all the action. This paper has three sections. The first looks into the origins of antidumping regulation, the second examines contemporary antidumping regulation -- antidumping under the GATT -- and the third summarizes the import of the first two.

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, J. Michael, 1991. "The origins and evolution of antidumping regulation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 783, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:783

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Fors, Gunnar, 1991. "Stainless steel in Sweden : antidumping attacks, good international citizenship," Policy Research Working Paper Series 744, The World Bank.
    2. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-466, June.
    3. repec:fth:michin:219 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Hansen, Wendy L., 1990. "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 21-46, March.
    5. Jackson, J.H., 1988. "The Gatt Consistency Of Export Restraint Arrangements," Working Papers 219, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    6. Finger, J Michael & Nogues, Julio, 1987. "International Control of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 1(4), pages 707-725, September.
    7. Michael Finger & Patrick Messerlin, 1989. "The effects of industrial countries' policies on developing countries," Sciences Po publications 3, Sciences Po.
    8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8338 is not listed on IDEAS
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    3. Douglas Irwin, 2004. "The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Actions in Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 10582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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