Does the semi-autonomous agency model function in a low-governance environment ? the case of the road development agency in Zambia
This paper uses Zambia as a case study to assess empirically whether political interference in a low-governance environment has diminished in the past years as expected after a semi-autonomous agency model was set up ten years ago. The road sector in Zambia has experienced some significant developments since then. The paper uses data on contract from 2008 to 2011 and analyses a number of key trends related to Road Development Agency governance and staffing dynamics as well as procurement and project selection within the institution. The main findings indicate that, after some years of implementation of these reforms, there is reason to question whether the model of semi-autonomous agency enables road management to be shielded from political interference. Zambia may be an isolated case but, so far, this model does not seem to have been able to decrease political interference in the selection or supervision of projects and there seems to have been an increased lack of accountability of civil servants working in this sector.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ken Gwilliam & Ajay Kumar, 2003. "How Effective Are Second-Generation Road Funds? A Preliminary Appraisal," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 113-128.
- Raballand, Gael & Kunaka, Charles & Giersing, Bo, 2008. "The impact of regional liberalization and harmonization in road transport services : a focus on Zambia and lessons for landlocked countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4482, The World Bank.
- Bent Flyvbjerg, 2009.
"Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built--and what we can do about it,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Oxford University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 344-367, Autumn.
- Bent Flyvbjerg, 2013. "Survival of the Unfittest: Why the Worst Infrastructure Gets Built, And What We Can Do about It," Papers 1303.6571, arXiv.org.
- Melvin Ayogu, 1999. "Before Prebendalism: A Positive Analysis of Core Infrastructure Investment in a Developing Fiscal Federalism," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 11(2), pages 169-198.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6585. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.