IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3433.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Measuring the risk on housing investment in the informal sector: theory and evidence from Pune, India

Author

Listed:
  • Kapoor, Mudit
  • Le Blanc, David

Abstract

The authors provide an economic framework to analyze investment in informal housing in developing countries. They consider a simple model of investment in the housing market where investors can choose between two sectors-the formal sector, where physical investment faces no risk of destruction, and the informal sector, where investment in each period is subjected to an exogenous risk of destruction. Construction costs differ between the two sectors. All households are renters. Renters shop for dwelling attributes and do not care about the sector (formal or informal) itself. The model implies that returns on investment, measured by the rent-to-value ration, will be higher in the informal sector. The authors use a survey conducted by the World Bank in Pune, India in 2002. The sample comprises 2,850 households. This survey had the peculiarity of asking the households, regardless of tenure status, questions about the market rent and value of their dwelling. Thus they can calculate individual rates of return for each unit without facing the typical selection bias problems. Comparing the distributions of returns in the informal and formal sectors, the authors obtain the following results: 1) Rates of return are significantly higher in the informal sector, as predicted by the model. 2) These figures imply a perceived risk on housing investment in the informal sector equivalent to an annual destruction rate ranging between 1 and 2 percent. 3) The two distributions of rates of return present highly idiosyncratic components and are not well explained by variables proxying either the strength of informal property rights or lower perceived risks of eviction.

Suggested Citation

  • Kapoor, Mudit & Le Blanc, David, 2004. "Measuring the risk on housing investment in the informal sector: theory and evidence from Pune, India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3433, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3433
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/01/000160016_20041101164422/Rendered/PDF/wps3433.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, 2002. "Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 986-1019, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kapoor, Mudit & le Blanc, David, 2008. "Measuring risk on investment in informal (illegal) housing: Theory and evidence from Pune, India," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 311-329, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wang, Hui & Riedinger, Jeffrey & Jin, Songqing, 2015. "Land documents, tenure security and land rental development: Panel evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 220-235.
    2. Kapoor, Mudit & le Blanc, David, 2008. "Measuring risk on investment in informal (illegal) housing: Theory and evidence from Pune, India," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 311-329, July.
    3. Daniel Ayalew Ali & Stefan Dercon & Madhur Gautam, 2011. "Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 42(1), pages 75-86, January.
    4. Letrouit,Lucie Michele Maya & Selod,Harris, 2020. "Trust or Property Rights ? Can Trusted Relationships Substitute for Costly Land Registration in West African Cities ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9310, The World Bank.
    5. Macours, Karen, 2002. "Insecurity Of Property Rights And Matching In The Tenancy Market," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19603, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Jérémie GIGNOUX & Karen MACOURS & Liam WREN-LEWIS, 2015. "Impact of land administration programs on agricultural productivity and rural development: existing evidence, challenges and new approaches," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 96(3), pages 467-498.
    7. Liesbet Vranken & Karen Macours & Nivelin Noev & Johan Swinnen, 2007. "Property Rights Imperfections, Asset Allocation, and Welfare: Co-Ownership in Bulgaria," LICOS Discussion Papers 18007, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    8. Hartwell, Christopher A. & Malinowska, Anna P., 2019. "Informal institutions and firm valuation," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-1.
    9. Brueckner, Jan K. & Lall, Somik V., 2015. "Cities in Developing Countries," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1399-1455, Elsevier.
    10. Chen, Ying & Chen, Kevin Z., 2022. "Property Rights and Land Rental Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment in China," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322541, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2006. "Tenure security and land-related investment: Evidence from Ethiopia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1245-1277, July.
    12. Fabio Soares & Yuri Suarez Dillon Soares, 2005. "The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela- Bairro: What do the Data Say?," OVE Working Papers 0805, Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE).
    13. Monkkonen, Paavo, 2016. "Where do Property Rights Matter More? Explaining the Variation in Demand for Property Titles across Cities in Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 67-78.
    14. Lai, Yani & Wang, Jiayuan & Lok, Waiming, 2017. "Redefining property rights over collective land in the urban redevelopment of Shenzhen, China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 485-493.
    15. Tilman Br�ck, 2003. "Investment in Land, Tenure Security and Area Farmed in Northern Mozambique," HiCN Working Papers 01, Households in Conflict Network.
    16. Brueckner, Jan K., 2013. "Slums in developing countries: New evidence for Indonesia," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 278-290.
    17. Deininger, Klaus & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Alemu, Tekie, 2008. "Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment, and land markets : evidence from Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4764, The World Bank.
    18. Jan K. Brueckner & Harris Selod, 2009. "A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 28-51, February.
    19. Li, Jingrong & Zhang, Chenlei & Mi, Yunsheng, 2021. "Land titling and internal migration: Evidence from China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    20. Gandelman, Néstor, 2008. "Titling and Chronic Diseases: Evidence from A Natural Experiment in Uruguay," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3332, Inter-American Development Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal Products; Banks&Banking Reform; Non Bank Financial Institutions; Poverty Assessment; Health Economics&Finance;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3433. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.