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Public officials and their institutional environment - an analytical model for assessing the impact of institutional change on public sector performance

Author

Listed:
  • Manning, Nick
  • Mukherjee, Ranjana
  • Gokcekus, Omer

Abstract

To perform well, public officials must be confident enough about the future, to be able to see a relationship between their efforts, and an eventual outcome. Their expectations are shaped by their institutional environment. If the rules are not credible, or are unlikely to be enforced, of if they expect policies to be contradicted, or resources to flow unpredictably, results will be uncertain, so there is little point in working purposefully. The authors present an analytical framework, used to design a series of surveys of public officials'views of their institutional environment, and to analyze the information generated in fifteen countries. They describe how survey results help map public sector's strengths, and weaknesses, and offer an approach to identifying potential payoffs from reforms. The framework emphasizes how heterogeneous incentives, and institutional arrangements are within he public sector. It emphasizes how important it is for policymakers to base decisions on information (not generalizations) that suggests what is most likely to work, and where. In building on the premise that public officials'actions - and hence their organization's performance - depend on the institutional environment in which they find themselves, this framework avoids simplistic anti-government positions, bur doesn't defend poor performance. Some public officials perform poorly, and engage in rent seeking, but some selfless, and determined public officials, work hard under extremely difficult conditions. This framework offers an approach for understanding both bad performance, and good, and for presenting the results to policymakers in a format that leadsto more informed choices, about public sector reform. Types of reforms discussed include strengthening the credibility of rules for evaluation, for record management, for training, and for recruitment; ensuring that staff support government policy; preventing political interference, or micro-management; assuring staff that they will be treated fairly; and, making government policies consistent.

Suggested Citation

  • Manning, Nick & Mukherjee, Ranjana & Gokcekus, Omer, 2000. "Public officials and their institutional environment - an analytical model for assessing the impact of institutional change on public sector performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2427, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2427
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Omer Gokcekus & Nick Manning & Ranjana Mukherjee & Raj Nallari, 2001. "Institutional Environment and Public Officials' Performance in Guyana," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13944, December.
    2. La Forgia, Gerard & Raha, Shomikho & Shaik, Shabbeer & Maheshwari, Sunil Kumar & Ali, Rabia, 2014. "Parallel systems and human resource management in India's public health services : a view from the front lines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6953, The World Bank.
    3. Ragasa, Catherine & Babu, Suresh & Abdullahi, Aliyu Sabi & Abubakar, Baba Yusuf, 2010. "Strengthening innovation capacity of Nigerian agricultural research organizations:," IFPRI discussion papers 01050, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Arenas de Mesa, Alberto & Mosqueira, Edgardo, 2023. "Institutional transformation and strengthening of Latin America’s ministries of finance: From control to the strategic use of public resources for development," Documentos de Proyectos 48846, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    5. Francis Y. Owusu, 2012. "Organizational culture and public sector reforms in a post–Washington consensus era: Lessons from Ghana’s good reformers," Progress in Development Studies, , vol. 12(2-3), pages 135-151, July.
    6. Kalonga Stambuli, 2002. "State Hegemony, Macroeconomic effects and Private Enterprise in Malawi," Public Economics 0211001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Aggarwal, Raj & Goodell, John W., 2013. "Political-economy of pension plans: Impact of institutions, gender, and culture," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1860-1879.
    8. World Bank, 2002. "Brazil : The New Growth Agenda, Volume 2. Detailed Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 15287, The World Bank Group.
    9. Minogue, Martin, 2005. "Apples and Oranges: Problems in the Analysis of Comparative Regulatory Governance," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30589, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    10. Arenas de Mesa, Alberto & Mosqueira, Edgardo, 2023. "Institutional transformation and strengthening of Latin America’s ministries of finance: From control to the strategic use of public resources for development," Coediciones, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 48846 edited by Eclac, March.
    11. Ranjana Mukherjee & Omer Gokcekus & Nick Manning & Pierre Landell-Mills, 2001. "Bangladesh : The Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13861, December.
    12. Catherine Ragasa, 2016. "Organizational and Institutional Barriers to the Effectiveness of Public Expenditures: The Case of Agricultural Research Investments in Nigeria and Ghana," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 28(4), pages 660-689, September.
    13. Minogue, Martin, 2005. "Apples and oranges: problems in the analysis of comparative regulatory governance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 195-214, May.
    14. Dick Durevall, 2001. "Reform of the Malawian Public Sector: Incentives, Governance and Accountability," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-109, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Knight-John, Malathy, 2005. "Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Tool for Improved Regulatory Governance in Sri Lanka?," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30626, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).

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