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Information asymmetry and institutions: re-looking at autonomous councils in the hills district of Assam

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  • Choudhury, Saswati

Abstract

The transaction cost approach can be used as a tool for studying the political institutions which engage in sharing of power and responsibilities. This paper makes an attempt to present an analytical framework of governance structure in the Autonomous Councils in the two hills districts of Karbi Anglong and N.C. Hills in the State of Assam. The first section of the paper gives a brief introduction to the theoretical framework of the transaction cost and information asymmetry and moral hazard problem. In the next section, these concepts are examined in the context of the autonomous councils in the hills district.

Suggested Citation

  • Choudhury, Saswati, 2009. "Information asymmetry and institutions: re-looking at autonomous councils in the hills district of Assam," MPRA Paper 30848, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30848
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34958/1/MPRA_paper_34958.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information Asymmetry; Moral Hazard; principal; agent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;

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