IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Securing access to international markets


  • Snape, Richard H.


The unconditional extension of the fruits of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is giving way to bilateral and other discriminatory trade agreements. Led by the United States, GATT has taken a strong position against discrimination: the benefits of negotiations under GATT generally have been extended to all contracting parties without specific conditions or reservations. This unconditional extension of benefits - the unconditional most favored nation principle (MFN) - is now under considerable pressure. This paper finds that the threat to multilateralism and small traders will be reduced if : (i) new trade liberalizing"clubs"that are formed in the Uruguay Round, or elsewhere, are open to new members on the same terms that apply to the founders; (ii) compliance with the rules of such clubs is determined multilaterally and not unilaterally by any existing members; (iii) markets that are levered open are opened in a nondiscriminatory manner; (iv) preferential trading agreements conform to the relevant GATT rule - Article XXIV and; (v) the main safeguard provision of GATT (Article XIX) remains nondiscriminatory.

Suggested Citation

  • Snape, Richard H., 1988. "Securing access to international markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 105, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:105

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Julio.J. Nogués & Andrzej Olechowski & L. Alan Winters, 2015. "The Extent of Nontariff Barriers to Industrial Countries' Imports," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Non-Tariff Barriers, Regionalism and Poverty Essays in Applied International Trade Analysis, chapter 2, pages 29-47 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Richard H. Snape, 1988. "Is Non-discrimination Really Dead?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, March.
    3. André Sapir & Sam Laird, 1987. "Tariff preference," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8248, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.