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Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries


  • de Melo, Jaime
  • Winters, L Alan


This article analyzes the resource implications of voluntary export restraints (VERs) for exporting countries. A simple analytical method is used to demonstrate that, by reducing the marginal revenue of its factors of production, a VER causes an industry in the exporting country to contract, and that the efficiency losses from a VER depend on the ease with which sales can be diverted from the restricted toward the unrestricted markets. The method is applied to test the effects of the U.S. Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA) for producers of leather footwear in the Republic of Korea during the period 1977-81. We estimate that the marginal revenue product of factors employed in leather footwear declined by as much as 9 percent because of the OMA, an estimate that is corroborated by inspection of time series on output, employment, and wages of the Korean footwear sector. This implies that there was pressure on the Korean footwear industry to contract as a result of the OMA. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • de Melo, Jaime & Winters, L Alan, 1990. "Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(2), pages 209-233, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbecrv:v:4:y:1990:i:2:p:209-33

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Julio.J. Nogués & Andrzej Olechowski & L. Alan Winters, 2015. "The Extent of Nontariff Barriers to Industrial Countries' Imports," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Non-Tariff Barriers, Regionalism and Poverty Essays in Applied International Trade Analysis, chapter 2, pages 29-47 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Trela, I. & Whalley, J., 1988. "Do Developing Countries Lose From The Mfa?," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 8804c, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
    3. Hickman, Bert G. & Lau, Lawrence J., 1973. "Elasticities of substitution and export demands in a world trade model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-380, December.
    4. Neary, J. P. & Roberts, K. W. S., 1980. "The theory of household behaviour under rationing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 25-42, January.
    5. Feenstra, Robert C., 1985. "Automobile prices and protection: The U.S.-Japan trade restraint," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 49-68.
    6. repec:wsi:wschap:9789813108448_0025 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bark, Taeho & de Melo, Jaime, 1988. "Export Quota Allocations, Export Earnings, and Market Diversification," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 2(3), pages 341-348, September.
    8. David G. Tarr, 2017. "Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the United States and the European Economic Community," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Trade Policies for Development and Transition, chapter 25, pages 595-616 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Aigner, Dennis J. & Hsiao, Cheng & Kapteyn, Arie & Wansbeek, Tom, 1984. "Latent variable models in econometrics," Handbook of Econometrics,in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1321-1393 Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. De Santis, Roberto A., 1997. "Why exporting countries agree voluntary export restraints: The oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier," Kiel Working Papers 841, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).

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