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Co-adaptation: From MARL Non-stationarity to the Dynamics of Economic Adjustment

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Lisicki

    (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences)

  • Tomasz Kopczewski

    (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences)

Abstract

Economic agents adapt their behavior to experience generated by interactions with other market participants. When several agents update their behavioral rules simultaneously, these adaptation processes become interdependent. We refer to this mechanism as co-adaptation. The paper develops a formal representation that separates the continuation of an agent's own rule updates from cross-agent effects on subsequent updates. In a two-agent system, mutual influence can increase the cumulative effect of an initial change and prolong the resulting adjustment process. A simple model of price adjustment between two firms shows how these effects depend on adjustment speed and the response to a competitor's price change. With more agents, interdependencies between adaptation processes form a directed network. This perspective links economic adjustment to multi-agent reinforcement learning, where learning by one agent changes the environment experienced by others, and clarifies when such non-stationarity is part of economic dynamics rather than only a computational difficulty.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Lisicki & Tomasz Kopczewski, 2026. "Co-adaptation: From MARL Non-stationarity to the Dynamics of Economic Adjustment," Working Papers 2026-31, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
  • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2026-31
    as

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    File URL: https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/download_file/0e8d4dc2-f9ed-445e-bbb5-65306946199e/4282
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George William Evans, 2001. "Expectations in Macroeconomics Adaptive versus Eductive Learning," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 52(3), pages 573-582.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    3. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(4), pages 807-824.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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