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Testing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Competition on Cable Television Rates

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Abstract

Regulation of the cable television industry was marked by remarkable periods of deregulation, re-regulation, and re-deregulation during the 1980s and 1990s. Using FCC firm-level survey data spanning 1993 to 2001, we model and econometrically estimate the effect of regulation and competition on cable rates. Our calculations indicate that while regulation lowered rates for small system operators, it raised them for medium and large systems. Meanwhile, competition consistently decreased rates from 5.6 to 8.8 percent, with even larger declines during periods of regulation. Our results suggest that competition is more effective than regulation in containing cable prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Mary T. Kelly & John S. Ying, 2009. "Testing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Competition on Cable Television Rates," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 3, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vil:papers:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beard, T Randolph & Ekelund, Robert B. & Ford, George S. & Saba, Richard S., 2001. "Price-Quality Tradeoffs and Welfare Effects in Cable Television Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 107-123, September.
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    6. Mary T. Kelly & John S. Ying, 2003. "On Measuring Competitive Viability and Monopoly Power in Cable: An Empirical Cost Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 962-970, November.
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    12. Chipty, Tasneem, 1995. "Horizontal Integration for Bargaining Power: Evidence from the Cable Television Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 375-397, Summer.
    13. Beil, Richard O, Jr. & Dazzio Jr., Thomas & Ekelund Jr., Robert B. & Jackson, John D., 1993. "Competition and the Price of Municipal Cable Television Services: An Empirical Study," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 401-415, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cable rates; regulation; competition;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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