Labor Markets, Unemployment and Optimal Inflation
The optimal infation rate and the relationship between inflation and unemployment are central issues in macroeconomics. It is widely accepted that inflation is a monetary phenomenon. However, there is little consensus with regard to unemployment. Economists differ widely in their view of labor markets and wage-setting mechanisms. The present paper develops a search-theoretic monetary model with imperfect labor markets. It studies the issue of the optimal inflation rate and the relationship between inflation and unemployment under four widely used wage-setting mechanisms: search and matching, wage posting, union bargaining, and efficiency wage. It finds that a higher inflation rate reduces output and employment under all wage setting mechanisms. The Friedman rule is not optimal under any wage setting mechanism except wage posting.
|Date of creation:||17 Dec 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://web.uvic.ca/econ
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moen, E.R., 1995.
"Competitive Search Equilibrium,"
37/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Shi Shougong, 1995.
"Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-496, December.
- Shouyong Shi, 1995. "Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 916, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Shi Shouyong, 1997.
"Search for a Monetary Propagation Mechanism,"
966, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Benoit Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2000.
"Bidding for Labor,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(4), pages 619-649, October.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:1303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lori Cretney)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.