A Note on Walrasian Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Aggregate Uncertainty
In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) [PT] have shown that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria extend to economies with moral hazard, when agents' trades are observable (exclusive contracts can be implemented). More recently, Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) [BC] have argued that Walrasian equilibria may (robustly) fail to exist when the class of moral hazard economies considered by Prescott and Townsend is generalized to allow for the presence of aggregate, in addition to idiosyncratic, uncertainty and for preferences which are nonseparable in consumption and effort. We re-examine here the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria in the moral hazard economy considered by Bennardo and Chiappori. We show that Walrasian equilibria always exist in such economy and are incentive efficient, so the results of Prescott and Townsend continue to hold in the more general set-up considered by Bennardo and Chiappori.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
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- Belen Jerez, 2005.
"Incentive Compatibility and Pricing under Moral Hazard,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 28-47, January.
- Belén Jerez, 2003. "Incentive Compatibility And Pricing Under Moral Hazard," Economics Working Papers we035722, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984.
"Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
- Edward C Prescott & Robert M Townsend, 2010. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2069, David K. Levine.
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