Economies with Observable Types
We study economies of asymmetric information with observable types. Trade takes place in lotteries. Individuals face a standard budget constraint, while the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed on the production set of the intermediaries. This formalization encompasses Moral Hazard, as in Jerez (2003, 2005), and Private Information economies. Equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient, but, contrary to what stated for example in Jerez (2005), the set of equilibrium allocations may be empty and the Second Welfare Theorem may fail. This happens for two reasons. First, constrained efficient allocations may violate the necessary and sufficient conditions of price supportability for the individuals. Second, even when constrained efficient allocation are price supportable, they may fail to be a profit maximizing choice of the firm at the individual supporting prices. To restore existence of an equilibrium the firm has to be restricted to supply allocations with support in the set of incentive compatible contracts. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Jerez, Belen, 2003.
"A dual characterization of incentive efficiency,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 1-34, September.
- Bel? Jerez, 2001. "A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 494.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Belen Jerez, 2005. "Incentive Compatibility and Pricing under Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(1), pages 28-47, January.
- Jerez, Belén, 2003. "Incentive compatibility and pricing under moral hazard," UC3M Working papers. Economics we035722, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Malinvaud, E., 1972. "The allocation of individual risks in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 312-328, April.
- Cass, David & Chichilnisky, Graciela & Wu, Ho-Mou, 1996. "Individual Risk and Mutual Insurance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 333-341, March.
- Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria under Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 785-817, August.
- Alberto Bennardo & P.A. Chiappori, 2002. "Bertrand and Walras equilibria under moral hazard," CSEF Working Papers 87, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000748, David K. Levine.
- Bennardo, Alberto & Chiappori, Pierre-André, 2002. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 3650, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kehoe, Timothy J. & Levine, David K. & Prescott, Edward C., 2002. "Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 39-69, November.
- Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine & Edward Prescott, 2000. "Lotteries, Sunspots and Incentive Constraints," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1974, David K. Levine.
- Piero Gottardi & BelÃ©n Jerez, 2007. "Comment on "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria under Moral Hazard"," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(5), pages 893-900, October.
- Malinvaud, E, 1973. "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual Risks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 383-410, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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