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Emergence and Evolution of Property Rights: an Agent Based Perspective

In this paper we provide a critical assessment on how agent based models (ABMs) may improve and extend the traditional theoretical approaches on the origin and evolution of property rights, namely the economics of property rights and the evolutionary game models on contest behavior. We contend that ABMs, through their focus on adaptive complex systems, integrate and foster the analytical capacity of traditional approaches in several directions. First, they can add behavioral rules which go beyond simple utility maximization, such as those deriving from cultural traits. Second, they not only allow indentyfing stationary outcomes, but also the timing of evolutionary patterns. Third, ABMs highlight how the structure of interactions among agents will influence the outcome.

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File URL: http://www.unito.it/unitoWAR/ShowBinary/FSRepo/D031/Allegati/WP2013Dip/WP_40_2013.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers with number 201340.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:201340
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  1. Olivier Thebaud & Bruno Locatelli, 2001. "Modelling the Emergence of Resource-Sharing Conventions: an Agent-Based Approach," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 3.
  2. Gintis, Herbert, 2007. "The evolution of private property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-16, September.
  3. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-79, April.
  4. Field, Barry C, 1989. "The Evolution of Property Rights," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 319-45.
  5. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, June.
  6. Wander Jager & Marco A. Janssen, 2002. "Stimulating diffusion of green products," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 283-306.
  7. Smith, Henry E, 2002. "Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages S453-87, June.
  8. Felix Flentge & Daniel Polani & Thomas Uthmann, 2001. "Modelling the Emergence of Possession Norms Using Memes," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(4), pages 3.
  9. Peter Deadman & Edella Schlager & Randy Gimblett, 2000. "Simulating Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Adaptive Agents Employing Alternate Communication Routines," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 3(2), pages 2.
  10. Scott Moss, 2001. "Game Theory: Limitations and an Alternative," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 2.
  11. Janssen, Marco A., 2007. "Coordination in irrigation systems: An analysis of the Lansing-Kremer model of Bali," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-3), pages 170-190, March.
  12. Catherine Hafer, 2006. "On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 119-143.
  13. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-62, December.
  14. Clay, Karen & Wright, Gavin, 2005. "Order without law? Property rights during the California gold rush," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 155-183, April.
  15. Allen, Douglas W, 2002. "The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages S339-58, June.
  16. Lueck, Dean, 1994. "Common property as an egalitarian share contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 93-108, September.
  17. Anderson, C. Leigh & Swimmer, Eugene, 1997. "Some empirical evidence on property rights of first peoples," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, May.
  18. Matthew J. Baker, 2003. "An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 124-173, February.
  19. Levmore, Saul, 2002. "Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages S421-51, June.
  20. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
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