Revealed Preferences for Macroeconomic Stabilization
In the new Keynesian model of endogenous stabilization governments have objectives with respect to macroeconomic performance, but are constrained by an augmented Phillips curve. Because they react more quickly to inflation shocks than private agents, governments can lean against the macroeconomic wind. We develop an econometric test of this characterization of the political-economic equilibrium. Applying this methodology to a variety of quadratic social welfare functions provides inferences about the functional form of stabilization preferences and about the formation of expectations.
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|Date of creation:||2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Applied Economics, May 2008 11(1), pp.119-43.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1645 E. Central Campus Dr. Front, Salt Lake City, UT 84112-9300|
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Web page: http://economics.utah.edu
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- Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-183, May.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:04:p:1467-1487_26 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1983. "Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance: Are Voters Really So Naive?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 385-392, August.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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