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Consumers Win-back as Exclusionary Conduct. Some Insights for Antitrust Law


  • Antonio Nicita



Incumbents' winback actions recently received a growing antitrust scrutiny in network industries. These actions refer to incumbents’ strategies aimed at regaining, through targeted marketing and selective discounts, former customers who switched to a new entrant. We analyze the impact of winback actions on competition and discuss pros and cons of a temporarily ban on incumbent's side, through the so-called 'winback rules'.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Consumers Win-back as Exclusionary Conduct. Some Insights for Antitrust Law," Department of Economics University of Siena 565, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:565

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-359, December.
    2. Ordover, Janusz A. & Saloner, Garth, 1989. "Predation, monopolization, and antitrust," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 537-596 Elsevier.
    3. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-1145, December.
    4. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    5. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    6. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
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    More about this item


    Entry Deterrence; Exit Inducement; Exclusionary Strategies; Winback; Blockaded Expansion; Holed Bucket Effect;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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