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Rethinking Antitrust in the Presence of Transaction Costs: Coasian Implications

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  • Dennis Carlton
  • Bryan Keating

Abstract

This article analyzes how transaction costs influence the ability to charge nonlinear prices and how market structure and industry behavior affect those transaction costs. The failure to recognize that nonlinear pricing produces a different equilibrium than linear pricing together with a recognition that the pricing mechanism can be altered by conduct under antitrust review explains why the usual antitrust analysis can be misleading. The paper illustrates its points using merger simulations with nonlinear pricing. Finally, the paper analyzes how to identify situations where market power might arise and applies the analysis to exclusive dealing, credit cards and FRAND royalties. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Carlton & Bryan Keating, 2015. "Rethinking Antitrust in the Presence of Transaction Costs: Coasian Implications," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(4), pages 307-321, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:46:y:2015:i:4:p:307-321
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-015-9453-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis W. Carlton & Bryan Keating, 2015. "Antitrust, Transaction Costs, and Merger Simulation with Nonlinear Pricing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 269-289.
    2. Dennis W. Carlton & Mark A. Israel, 2021. "Effects of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines on Merger Review: Based on Ten Years of Practical Experience," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 213-234, February.

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