IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jcomle/v9y2013i3p531-552..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Economic Interpretation Of Frand

Author

Listed:
  • Dennis W. Carlton
  • Allan L. Shampine

Abstract

Standard-setting organizations have, for many years, required members to commit to license patents essential to use of standards on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Unfortunately, SSOs have not defined what FRAND means, leaving its interpretation to courts and regulators. This article explains the economic concerns underlying FRAND—hold-up and strategic behavior, leading to inefficient behavior in a standard-setting context—and how a proper economic interpretation of FRAND can eliminate or mitigate those concerns. Ex ante analyses based on the “reasonable” principle can potentially eliminate hold-up, but, as a practical matter, may be costly, difficult to perform, and error-prone. In such circumstances, the “non-discriminatory” principle of FRAND can provide some protection against hold-up even when the “reasonable” principle of FRAND does not.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, 2013. "An Economic Interpretation Of Frand," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 531-552.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:3:p:531-552.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nht019
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jong-Hee Hahn & Chan KIm, 2018. "Input price discrimination with differentiated final products," Working papers 2018rwp-118, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    2. repec:taf:glecrv:v:45:y:2016:i:3:p:233-250 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jay Pil Choi, 2016. "FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 233-250, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:3:p:531-552.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jcle .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.