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The Libertarian Identification Rule in Finite Atomistic Lattices

  • Stefano Vannucci


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    Collective Identification Procedures (CIPs) model admission rules regulating membership in associations, communities and clubs: the Libertarian identification rule Fl is the CIP which essentially relies on self-certification. This paper studies Fl in an arbitrary finite atomistic lattice, allowing an unified treatment of collective identification problems with either exogenous or endogenous choice of classification labels. An elementary axiomatic characterization of Fl in that general setting is provided and contrasted with previously known characterizations which only work in more specialized (e.g. distributive) lattices, and are therefore confined to collective identification problems with exogenously fixed labels. Non-manipulability properties of Fl on a certain simple restricted domain are also considered and shown to hold for any finite atomistic lattice

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    Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 526.

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    Date of creation: Jan 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:526
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    1. Dov Samet & David Schmeidler, 1999. "Between Liberalism and Democracy," Game Theory and Information 9908001, EconWPA.
    2. Nicolas, Houy, 2007. ""I want to be a J!": Liberalism in group identification problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 59-70, July.
    3. Monjardet, B., 1990. "Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-71, August.
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