A Proof for 'Who is a J' Impossibility Theorem
In the analysis of group identification, Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Logique Analyse 160, 385-395, have shown that any method to aggregate the opinions of a group of agents about the individuals in the group that posses a specific attribute, such as race, nationality, profession, etc., must be dictatorial or, otherwise, it must violate either consensus or independence. This result is known in the literature as 'Who is a J' impossibility theorem. This note enhances slightly the result by weakening the axiom consensus, and it offers a direct proof of the theorem based on the structure of the family of decisive coalitions.
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- David Schmeidler, 2000.
"Between LIberalism and Democracy,"
00-08, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Rubinstein, Ariel & Fishburn, Peter C., 1986. "Algebraic aggregation theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 63-77, February.
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