Loans, Interest Rates and Guarantees: Is There a Link?
This paper aims at shedding light on the influence of guarantees on the loan pricing. After reviewing the literature on the role of guarantees in bank lending decisions, we estimate a bank interest rate model that explicitly includes collateral and personal guarantees as explanatory variables. We show that banks follow different lending policies according to the type of customer. In the case of firms banks seem to efficiently screen and monitor customers, and guarantees (real and personal) are used to reduce moral hazard problems. In the case of consumer households and sole proprietorships banks behave “lazily” by replacing screening and monitoring activities with personal guarantees. Collateral, instead, is used to separate good from bad customers (i.e., to mitigate adverse selection problems).
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/|
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