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Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression

Author

Listed:
  • Grigory V. Kalyagin

    () (Department of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University)

  • Vladimir A. Kozlov

    (Department of Demography, National Research University - Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi- democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Grigory V. Kalyagin & Vladimir A. Kozlov, 2012. "Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression," Working Papers 0001, Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:upa:wpaper:0001
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econ.msu.ru/ext/lib/Category/x1a/xb1/6833/file/0001.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    2. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2000. "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 63-84, April.
    3. Kornai, Janos, 1992. "The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198287766.
    4. Byeongju Jeong, 2000. "Bad Policies Under an Autocrat's Production," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp159, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Lazarev, Valery & Gregory, Paul, 2003. "Commissars and cars: A case study in the political economy of dictatorship," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-19, March.
    6. Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dictatorship; Stalinism; Repression; Plan; Principal-Agent;

    JEL classification:

    • P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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