The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
The paper extends and empirically tests Gordon Tullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935-1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession in an autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 103 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
Pages: 63-84
| Handle: | RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:103:y:2000:i:1-2:p:63-84 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Anderson, Gary M & Boettke, Peter J, 1993. " Perestroika and Public Choice: The Economics of Autocratic Succession in a Rent-Seeking Society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 101-18, February.
- Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October.
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