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Construction and public procurement in Uganda

Author

Listed:
  • Emanuele Colonnelli
  • Nicole Ntungire

Abstract

As it transitions to an oil-producing country, Uganda's investments in infrastructure and physical capital will increasingly depend on the ability of the construction sector to respond to surges in demand and transform investment effort into outcomes. Using administrative and survey data, this paper sets out to examine the current bottlenecks to production faced by the construction sector in Uganda and identifies possible policy remedies to relieve them.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Colonnelli & Nicole Ntungire, 2018. "Construction and public procurement in Uganda," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-180, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2018-180
    as

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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2018-180.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emanuele Colonnelli & Mounu Prem, 2022. "Corruption and Firms [Mafia and Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-experiment]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(2), pages 695-732.
    2. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
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