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Games and mechanism design in machine scheduling - an introduction

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  • Heydenreich, B.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Müller, R.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Uetz, M.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Heydenreich, B. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J., 2006. "Games and mechanism design in machine scheduling - an introduction," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006022
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2006022
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heydenreich, B. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J., 2006. "Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
    3. Rohde, K.I.M., 2005. "A reason for sophisticated investors not to seize arbitrage opportunities in markets without frictions," Research Memorandum 054, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    5. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    6. Müller, R.J. & Gui, H. & Vohra, R., 2004. "Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types," Research Memorandum 046, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    9. Nicole Megow & Marc Uetz & Tjark Vredeveld, 2006. "Models and Algorithms for Stochastic Online Scheduling," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 513-525, August.
    10. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    11. Feess, E. & Schieble, M. & Walzl, M., 2004. "When should principals acquire verifiable information?," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xiuli & Geng, Sujie & Cheng, T.C.E., 2018. "Negotiation mechanisms for an order subcontracting and scheduling problem," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 154-167.
    2. Lee, Kangbok & Leung, Joseph Y.-T. & Pinedo, Michael L., 2012. "Coordination mechanisms for parallel machine scheduling," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(2), pages 305-313.
    3. Herbert Hamers & Marco Slikker & Flip Klijn, 2015. "Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate," Working Papers 709, Barcelona School of Economics.

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