IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/1392.html

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

Author

Listed:
  • Hongwei Gui
  • Rudolf M¨uller
  • Rakesh V. Vohra

Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Hongwei Gui & Rudolf M¨uller & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types," Discussion Papers 1392, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1392
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1392.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-1259, September.
    2. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Apr 1998.
    3. Hoesel Stan van & Kraaij Anton F. van der & Mannino Carlo & Bouhtou Mustapha & Oriolo Gianpaolo, 2003. "Polynomial cases of the tarification problem," Research Memorandum 063, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Hanif D. Sherali & J. Cole Smith & Youngho Lee, 2000. "Enhanced Model Representations for an Intra-Ring Synchronous Optical Network Design Problem Allowing Demand Splitting," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 12(4), pages 284-298, November.
    5. Bruinshoofd, W.A. & Kool, C.J.M., 2002. "The determinants of corporate liquidity in the Netherlands," Research Memorandum 013, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. Manuel Laguna, 1994. "Clustering for the Design of SONET Rings in Interoffice Telecommunications," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(11), pages 1533-1541, November.
    7. Petra Bauer, 1997. "The Circuit Polytope: Facets," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(1), pages 110-145, February.
    8. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    9. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Jeffery Kennington & Eli Olinick & Augustyn Ortynski & Gheorghe Spiride, 2003. "Wavelength Routing and Assignment in a Survivable WDM Mesh Network," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 67-79, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. André Berger & Rudolf Müller & Seyed Hossein Naeemi, 2017. "Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 367-383, February.
    2. Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 283-298.
    3. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
    4. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    5. Birgit Heydenreich & Rudolf Müller & Marc Uetz & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2009. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 307-316, January.
    6. Berger, A. & Müller, R.J. & Naeemi, S.H., 2010. "Path-monotonicity and incentive compatibility," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018. "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 294-317.
    8. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    9. Paul H. Edelman & John A Weymark, 2018. "Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 18-00003, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    10. Debasis Mishra & Anup Pramanik & Souvik Roy, 2013. "Implementation in multidimensional domains with ordinal restrictions," Discussion Papers 13-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    11. Tang, Rui & Zhang, Mu, 2021. "Maxmin implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    12. Muller, Rudolf & Perea, Andres & Wolf, Sascha, 2007. "Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 344-358, November.
    13. Heydenreich, B. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J., 2006. "Games and mechanism design in machine scheduling - an introduction," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    14. Archer, Aaron & Kleinberg, Robert, 2014. "Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 340-366.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003. "Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
    2. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterjee & Arunava Sen, 2004. "Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000750, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
    4. Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 104-123, April.
    5. Peter Postl, 2013. "Efficiency versus optimality in procurement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 425-472, June.
    6. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
    7. Jorge Aseff & Hector Chade, 2008. "An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 731-746, September.
    8. Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Stan Van Hoesel, 2005. "Optimization in telecommunication networks," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 59(2), pages 180-205, May.
    10. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2001. "Know thy enemies : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions," Working papers 9, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    11. Sameer Mehta & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman & Vijay Mookerjee, 2020. "Sustaining a Good Impression: Mechanisms for Selling Partitioned Impressions at Ad Exchanges," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(1), pages 126-147, March.
    12. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    14. Utgoff, Naomi M., 2025. "Information-based discrimination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 20-30.
    15. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    16. Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2010. "When queueing is better than push and shove," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(3), pages 409-430, July.
    17. Daske, Thomas, 2019. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: "Gamification" and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 193148, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    18. van Hoesel, Stan, 2008. "An overview of Stackelberg pricing in networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(3), pages 1393-1402, September.
    19. Molnár, József & Virág, Gábor, 2008. "Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 360-363, May.
    20. Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024. "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 191-203.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1392. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fran Walker The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Fran Walker to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.