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Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Dietzenbacher, Bas

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

  • Hanssen, Pauline

    (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory)

  • Tamura, Yuki

Abstract

This paper studies reallocation problems where preferences are single-peaked and one agent is endowed with one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. We characterize all allocations that belong to the core, i.e. no group of agents is better off by reallocating among themselves. Under excess supply, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality select from the strong core. Under excess demand, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness select from the weak core, but there is no strategy-proof rule that selects from the strong core.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietzenbacher, Bas & Hanssen, Pauline & Tamura, Yuki, 2026. "Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2026005
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026005
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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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