Report NEP-DES-2026-06-22

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Marcin Anholcer & Maciej Bartkowiak & Bart{l}omiej Bosek & Jaros{l}aw Grytczuk, 2026, "Epistemic fair division of independence structures," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.11494, Jun.
• Kiho Yoon, 2026, "On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.03051, Jun.
• Yanchen Jiang & David C. Parkes & Tonghan Wang, 2026, "Duality for Optimal Multi-Item, Multi-Bidder Auction Design: Revenue Certificates through Deep Learning," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.10112, Jun.
• Irene Aldridge, 2026, "Comparing Market Mechanism Efficiencies," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.31072, May.
• Yukihiro Hoshino & Ayato Kitadai & Nariaki Nishino, 2026, "Do Matching Mechanisms Work with LLM Agents?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.03030, Jun.
• Will Sandholtz & Andrew Tai, 2026, "Random Matching with Minimums," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.26367, May.
• Dietzenbacher, Bas & Hanssen, Pauline & Tamura, Yuki, 2026, "Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership," Research Memorandum, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), number 005, Jun, DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026005.
• Jamie Tucker-Foltz & Richard Zeckhauser, 2026, "Cheap Talk in Bilateral Trade," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.01250, May.
• Anna Vakarova, 2026, "Existence and Optimality of Envy-Free random allocations," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.28263, May.
• Frank M. V. Feys, 2026, "Fairness and Strategy-Proofness in Automated Market Makers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.04959, Jun.
• Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2026, "Proper Calibeating," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.26703, May, revised Jun 2026.
• Christopher Blier-Wong & Jean-Gabriel Lauzier, 2026, "Designing entry-monotone risk-sharing pools," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.00972, May.
• Irene Aldridge, 2026, "Evaluating AI Investment Strategies," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.08791, Jun.
• Zhicheng Du & Hu Fu & Ying Qin & Zihe Wang, 2026, "Competitive Information Design in Sequential Search," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.03527, Jun.
• Ronen Gradwohl & Fengming Hu & Rann Smorodinsky, 2026, "Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2605.28265, May.
• Saakstra, Sake, 2026, "Mechanism Design over Magnitude: A Multi-Jurisdiction Evaluation of Carrot-Policy Effectiveness in Clean-Hydrogen Implementation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 129309, May.
• Hongcheng Li, 2026, "Hidden Commitment Power is Powerless," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2606.02769, Jun.