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The Indonesian Bank Crisis And Restructuring: Lessons And Implications For Other Developing Countries

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  • Mari PANGESTU

Abstract

Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and reveals its shortcomings. The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making capacity. Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis. There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms to strengthen the financial sector. Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a "one-size-fits-all" programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately, can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall recovery of the domestic economy. The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are specific to each country. [English only] Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and reveals its shortcomings. The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making capacity. Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis. There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms to strengthen the financial sector. Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a "one-size-fits-all" programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately, can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall recovery of the domestic economy. The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are specific to each country. [English only] Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and reveals its shortcomings. The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making capacity. Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis. There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms to strengthen the financial sector. Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a "one-size-fits-all" programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately, can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall recovery of the domestic economy. The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are specific to each country. [English only] Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and reveals its shortcomings. The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making capacity. Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis. There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms to strengthen the financial sector. Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a "one-size-fits-all" programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately, can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall recovery of the domestic economy. The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are specific to each country. [English only] Drawing on the Indonesian experience in 1997, this paper demonstrates the complexity of managing banking crises deals. It aims at deriving conclusions from this experience for other developing countries facing similar problems. The paper also refers to comparative experiences of other countries, in particular Malaysia and Thailand, examines the IMF programme and reveals its shortcomings. The key question is to what extent the ineffectiveness and slow progress of bank restructuring, corporate restructuring and continued dilemmas in macroeconomic management in Indonesia were due to shortcomings of the economic programme, its sequencing or emphasis, and to what extent it has to be attributed other factors, including corruption and lack of policy-making capacity. Although prudential requirements and regulations, such as lending limits, were introduced to address corporate governance problems, governance of the banking sector was generally weak, and there was little incentive for banks to make appropriate risk assessments in their activities. It is shown that structural weaknesses precipitated and aggravated the crisis. There is clear evidence for mistakes in the initial responses to the crisis by both the Government and the international financial institutions. The most difficult problems facing a country like Indonesia are the political and social constraints to rapid restructuring and reforms to strengthen the financial sector. Indonesia was obliged to implement second generation Washington consensus reforms focusing on corporate governance, bankruptcy procedures, business-government relations, and more restrictive prudential regulation. A clear message of the paper is that a "one-size-fits-all" programme is unlikely to be successful. Policy makers must be able to address linkages between the financial sector and macroeconomic performance, which, if not managed appropriately, can exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. There is also a need to reduce the concentration of bank ownership and to minimize moral hazards through the design of clear exit mechanisms. Moreover, attempts to restructure the banking system can only be successful in the context of an overall recovery of the domestic economy. The main message of the paper is the importance of appropriate speed and sequencing of necessary reforms, taking due account of the institutional, legal and human capacities that are specific to each country.

Suggested Citation

  • Mari PANGESTU, 2003. "The Indonesian Bank Crisis And Restructuring: Lessons And Implications For Other Developing Countries," G-24 Discussion Papers 23, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
  • Handle: RePEc:unc:g24pap:23
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James R. Barth & Gerard Caprio Jr. & Ross Levine, 2002. "Financial Regulation and Performance: Cross-COuntry Evidence," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 4, pages 113-142, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. Ross McLeod, 1999. "Crisis-Driven Changes to the Banking Laws and Regulations," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 147-154.
    3. George Soros, 1999. "The International Financial Crisis," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(2), pages 58-76, March.
    4. Masahiro Kawai, 2001. "Bank and Corporate Restructuring in Crisis-Affected East Asia: From Systemic Collapse to Reconstruction," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 317, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Lloyd Kenward, 1999. "Assessing Vulnerability to Financial Crisis: Evidence from Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(3), pages 71-95.
    6. Ms. Enrica Detragiache & Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 1998. "Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility," IMF Working Papers 1998/083, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Goodhart, Charles & Delargy, P J R, 1998. "Financial Crises: Plus ca Change, Plus C'est La Meme Chose," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 261-287, December.
    8. Caprio, Gerard & Honohan, Patrick, 2001. "Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World," MPRA Paper 9929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. World Bank, 2001. "Finance for Growth : Policy Choices in a Volatile World," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13895, December.
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    1. Yudaeva, Ksenia & Godunova, Maria & Kozlov, Konstantin & Ivanova, Nadezhda, 2009. "Exit strategies from the banking crisis: international experience," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 3, pages 98-149, June.
    2. Wahyoe Soedarmono & Philippe Rous & Amine Tarazi, 2011. "Bank Capital and Self-Interested Managers: Evidence from Indonesia," Working Papers hal-00918584, HAL.
    3. International Labour Office & International Institute for Labour Studies, 2011. "Indonesia : reinforcing domestic demand in times of crisis," Studies on Growth with Equity 463477, International Labour Office, Research Department.
    4. Chau H. A. Le, 2016. "Macro-financial linkages and bank behaviour: evidence from the second-round effects of the global financial crisis on East Asia," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 6(3), pages 365-387, December.
    5. Sarah Sanya & Mr. Montfort Mlachila, 2010. "Post-Crisis Bank Behavior: Lessons From Mercosur," IMF Working Papers 2010/001, International Monetary Fund.
    6. International Labour Office. & International Institute for Labour Studies., 2011. "Indonesia : reinforcing domestic demand in times of crisis," Studies on Growth with Equity, International Labour Office, Research Department, number 994634773402676, October.
    7. Harmincova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2014. "Microfinance around the world – regional SWOT analysis," MPRA Paper 58171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Nunn, Sharon, 2021. "Indonesia: IBRA's Asset Management Unit/ Asset Management of Credits," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 3(2), pages 381-409, April.
    9. Rudi Kurniawan, 2015. "Does Indonesia Pursue Sustainable Fiscal Policy?," Working Papers in Economics and Development Studies (WoPEDS) 201504, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University, revised Nov 2015.

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