Aid, Conditionality, and War Economies
When natural resource revenues provide an important motive and/or means for armed conflict, the transition from war peace faces three challenges: (i) ensuring that the benefits and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed so as to ease rather than exacerbate social tensions; (ii) channeling revenues to peaceful and productive purposes; and (iii) promoting accountability and transparency in natural resource management. Aid conditionality can help to address these challenges provided that three prerequisites are met: (i) there are domestic parties with sufficient authority and legitimacy to strike and implement aid-for-peace bargains; (ii) donor governments and agencies make peace their top priority, putting this ahead of other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional goals; and (iii) the aid 'carrot' is substantial enough to provide an incentive for pro-peace policies. Case studies of Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan illustrate both the scope and limitations of peace conditionality in such settings.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Rubin, Barnett R., 2000. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1789-1803, October.
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- Kisangani Emizet & Léonce Ndikumana, 2003. "The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo," Working Papers wp63, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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- Léonce Ndikumana & James Boyce, 2002. "Africa’s Debt: Who Owes Whom?," Working Papers wp48, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Gilbert, Christopher & Powell, Andrew & Vines, David, 1999. "Positioning the World Bank," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages F598-633, November.
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