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Individually-Consistent Sequential Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Gisèle Umbhauer
  • Arnaud Wolff

Abstract

We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called the individually-consistent sequential equilibrium (ICSE). This concept is more permissive than the sequential equilibrium (Kreps, Wilson (1982)) but more demanding than the self-confirming one (Fudenberg, Levine (1993)). We require that players share common beliefs on the actions planned to be played at all the information sets, but not on the potential deviations. Therefore, in contrast to Kreps, Wilson (1982), we allow different players to have in mind different perturbation systems, or alternative hypotheses. This is motivated by the fact that beliefs about unobserved events are by essence not verifiable.

Suggested Citation

  • Gisèle Umbhauer & Arnaud Wolff, 2019. "Individually-Consistent Sequential Equilibrium," Working Papers of BETA 2019-39, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-39
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    File URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2019/2019-39.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-23, November.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-23, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gisèle Umbhauer & Arnaud Wolff, 2022. "istance in Beliefs and Individually-Consistent Sequential Equilibrium," Working Papers of BETA 2022-37, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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