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Ordering Things: The Irish State Administration Database

Author

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  • Niamh Hardiman

    (School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin)

  • Colin Scott

    (UCD Centre for Regulation and Governance, UCD School of Law, University College Dublin)

Abstract

New theoretical approaches to the state have posed challenges for the comparative analysis of the organizational features of states. The analysis of state bodies and state agencies has largely been confined to the sub-discipline of public administration, and has been resistant to the systematic classification that has made progress possible in other areas of comparative politics. This article argues that there is much to be gained by reconceptualizing state bodies in a comparative context. This paper profiles the classification system underlying the construction of the Irish State Administration Database (ISAD) (Hardiman et al., 2011). This paper sets out a new approach to conceptualizing the organizational and functional features of states. ISAD not only provides a valuable research resource for work on the Irish state, but can also provide a framework for building a comparative research agenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Niamh Hardiman & Colin Scott, 2011. "Ordering Things: The Irish State Administration Database," Working Papers 201127, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucd:wpaper:201127
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    File URL: http://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201127.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    2. Paul Roness & Koen Verhoest & Kristin Rubecksen & Muiris MacCarthaigh, 2008. "Autonomy and Regulation of State Agencies: Reinforcement, Indifference or Compensation?," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 155-174, June.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    4. Moran, Michael, 2002. "Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 391-413, April.
    5. Héritier, Adrienne & Lehmkuhl, Dirk, 2008. "The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-17, April.
    6. Colin Scott, 2004. "Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State," Chapters, in: Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur (ed.), The Politics of Regulation, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Fabrizio Gilardi, 2008. "Delegation in the Regulatory State," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12818.
    8. Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær & Christensen, Jørgen Grønnegaard, 2009. "Governing Danish Agencies by Contract: From Negotiated Freedom to the Shadow of Hierarchy," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 55-78, April.
    9. Prasad, Monica, 2006. "The Politics of Free Markets," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226679013.
    10. Ciara Brown & Colin Scott, 2010. "Regulation in Ireland: History, Structure, Style and Reform," Working Papers 201044, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
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    Cited by:

    1. Muiris MacCarthaigh, 2011. "Politics, policy preferences and the evolution of Irish bureaucracy: A framework for analysis," Working Papers 201128, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.

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