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Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation Methods

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  • Slade, Margaret E.

Abstract

This article assesses recent empirical evidence on efficiencies and competitive harm that are associated with vertical mergers. It evaluates both ex post or retrospective empirical studies that rely on post merger data and ex ante or forecasting techniques that use premerger data. It develops the idea that, although there is a need for vertical merger screening tools, there are a number of problems that are associated with attempts to adapt horizontal screens to the vertical context. Mergers in the technology, media, and telecom sectors are emphasized because they tend to dominate contested vertical mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Slade, Margaret E., 2019. "Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation Methods," Microeconomics.ca working papers margaret_e._slade-2019-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 25 Jun 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:margaret_e._slade-2019-10
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    File URL: https://econ2017.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2019/06/TMTVert-Mergers3-full-Slade_Jun2019.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 989-1033, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Boehm & Jan Sonntag, 2019. "Vertical Integration and Foreclosure: Evidence from Production Network Data," CEP Discussion Papers dp1641, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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