Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Carmen Arguedas & Eva Camacho & José Zofío, 2010. "Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 261-274, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Innes, Robert & Bial, Joseph J, 2002. "Inducing Innovation in the Environmental Technology of Oligopolistic Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 265-287, September.
- Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 435-454, September.
- Harrington, Winston, 2003. "Regulating Industrial Water Pollution in the United States," Discussion Papers dp-03-03, Resources For the Future.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Permits, Standards, and Technology Innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 23-44, July.
- Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009.
"Taxes, Permits, and the Adoptation of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance,"
dp-09-20-efd, Resources For the Future.
- Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance," Working Papers in Economics 368, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo & Sanchez, Jose Miguel & Katz, Ricardo, 2002.
"A Market-Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 267-287, April.
- Juan-Pablo Montero & José Miguel Sánchez & Ricardo Katz, 2000. "A Market-Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 192, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 18-29, March.
- Shavell, Steven, 1992. "A note on marginal deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 345-355, September.
- Downing, Paul B. & Watson, William Jr., 1974. "The economics of enforcing air pollution controls," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 219-236, November.
- Oljaca, Neda & Keeler, Andrew G & Dorfman, Jeffrey, 1998. "Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 255-264, November.
- Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Voßwinkel, Jan & Birg, Laura, 2015.
"Minimum Quality Standards and Non-Compliance,"
Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy
112883, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Birg, Laura & Voßwinkel, Jan S., 2015. "Minimum quality standards and non-compliance," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 228, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Pauli Lappi, 2016. "The welfare ranking of prices and quantities under noncompliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(2), pages 269-288, April.
- Carmen Arguedas, 2013.
"Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 156-176, October.
- Arguedas, Carmen, 2010. "Pollution Standards, Technology Investment and Fines for Non-Compliance," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2010/05, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Jessica Coria & Xiao-Bing Zhang, 2015. "State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 359-381, October.
- repec:kap:itaxpf:v:24:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9439-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Clara Villegas-Palacio & Jessica Coria, 2010. "On the interaction between imperfect compliance and technology adoption: taxes versus tradable emissions permits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 274-291, December.
- repec:spr:envpol:v:19:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10018-016-0166-1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2017.
"Design standards and technology adoption: welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous,"
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies,
Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(2), pages 427-450, April.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Design standards and technology adoption: Welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous," DICE Discussion Papers 106, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
More about this item
Keywordsenvironmental policy; technology adoption; monitoring; non-compliance;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2009-05-16 (Law & Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uam:wpaper:200903. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Andrés Maroto-Sánchez). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dauames.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.