More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing
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- Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy, 2017. "More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 148-186, August.
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- Halac, Marina & Kremer, Ilan, 2018. "Experimenting with Career Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 12569, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2021.
"Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation [Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model],"
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- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2020.
- Thomas, Caroline, 2019. "Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 366-415.
- Chen, Chia-Hui & Ishida, Junichiro & Suen, Wing, 2024.
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- Ayse Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans, "undated".
"Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing?,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
23-033/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Ay?e Gül Mermer & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans, 2022. "Can Communication Mitigate Strategic Delays in Investment Timing?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-065/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Wagner, Peter A. & Klein, Nicolas, 2022.
"Strategic investment and learning with private information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- KLEIN, Nicolas & WAGNER, Peter, 2018. "Strategic investment and learning with private information," Cahiers de recherche 2018-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Nicolas KLEIN & Peter WAGNER, 2018. "Strategic Investment and Learning with Private Information," Cahiers de recherche 13-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Vincenzo Formisano & Maria Fedele & Emanuela Antonucci, 2016. "Innovation in Financial Services: A Challenge for Start-Ups Growth," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(3), pages 149-149, February.
- Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas & Levy, Raphaël, 2021.
"Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner’s) curse,"
TSE Working Papers
21-1202, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy & Thomas Mariotti, 2022. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse?," Working Papers halshs-03507030, HAL.
- Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy & Thomas Mariotti, 2022. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse?," PSE Working Papers halshs-03507030, HAL.
- Bobtcheff, Catherine & Levy, Raphaël & Mariotti, Thomas, 2021. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse ?," CEPR Discussion Papers 16024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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"Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2021.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2020.
- Alessandro Spiganti, 2020. "Can Starving Start‐ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 702-731, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Signaling; investment timing; financing of innovation; real options;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENT-2015-08-13 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-INO-2015-08-13 (Innovation)
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