Economic Science and Political Influence
When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who de- sign the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of mea- surement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009.
"Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Bos, Frits, 2011. "Three centuries of macro-economic statistics," MPRA Paper 35391, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Olivier Blanchard, 2009. "The State of Macro," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 209-228, 05.
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