Project Finance as a Risk-Management Tool in International Syndicated Lending
We develop a double moral hazard model that predicts that the use of project finance increases with both the political risk of the country in which the project is located and the influence of the lender over this political risk exposure. In contrast, the use of project finance should decrease as the economic health and corporate governance provisions of the borrowerâ€™s home country improve. When we test these predictions with a global sample of syndicated loans to borrowers in 139 countries, we find overall support for our model and provide evidence that multilateral development banks act as â€œpolitical umbrellasâ€ .
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