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Forced Ranking: Fluch oder Segen?

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  • Cardinaels, Eddy

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Feichter, Christoph

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Cardinaels, Eddy & Feichter, Christoph, 2023. "Forced Ranking: Fluch oder Segen?," Other publications TiSEM fbf9daf8-8658-4307-a733-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:fbf9daf8-8658-4307-a733-c335ee91e45f
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johannes Berger & Christine Harbring & Dirk Sliwka, 2013. "Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution--An Experimental Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(1), pages 54-68, June.
    2. B. William Demeré & Karen L. Sedatole & Alexander Woods, 2019. "The Role of Calibration Committees in Subjective Performance Evaluation Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1562-1585, April.
    3. Eddy Cardinaels & Christoph Feichter, 2021. "Forced Rating Systems from Employee and Supervisor Perspectives," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(5), pages 1573-1607, December.
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