IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20040117.html

The Pro-collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities

Author

Listed:
  • Jeroen Hinloopen

    (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Abstract

An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen Hinloopen, 2004. "The Pro-collusive Effect of Increased Cartel Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-117/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04117.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1973. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 435-435.
    2. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hans W. Friederiszick & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2008. "Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond A Passive Eu Cartel Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 89-113.
    2. Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996. "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers ecpap-96-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    4. Hakan Yilmazkuday, 2017. "Geographical dispersion of consumer search behaviour," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(57), pages 5740-5752, December.
    5. Wong, Kit Pong, 2008. "Does market demand volatility facilitate collusion?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 696-703, July.
    6. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    7. Helmuts Azacis & David R Collie, 2018. "Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 173-188, October.
    8. Salvatore Piccolo & Aldo Pignataro, 2016. "Consumer Loss Aversion, Product Experimentation and Implicit Collusion," CSEF Working Papers 457, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    9. Iuliana Zlatcu & Marta-Christina Suciu, 2017. "The role of economics in cartel detection. A review of cartel screens," Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People, Alliance of Central-Eastern European Universities, vol. 6(3), pages 16-26, September.
    10. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    11. Jochen Streb, 1999. "How to Win Schumpeterian Competition: Technological Transfers in the German Plastics Industry from the 1930s to the 1970s," Working Papers 811, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    12. Claudia Ranocchia & Luca Lambertini, 2021. "Porter Hypothesis vs Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Can There Be Environmental Policies Getting Two Eggs in One Basket?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(1), pages 177-199, January.
    13. Bantle, Melissa, 2024. "Screen for collusive behavior: A machine learning approach," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 01-2024, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
    14. Hong, Han & Ju, Gaosheng & Li, Qi & Yan, Karen X., 2024. "Varying-coefficient spatial dynamic panel data models with fixed effects: Theory and application," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 245(1).
    15. Peter S. Fader & John R. Hauser, 1988. "Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 553-582, September.
    16. Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
    17. Emilie Dargaud, 2006. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Post-Print halshs-00140138, HAL.
    18. Aaltio, Aapo & Buri, Riku & Jokelainen, Antto & Lundberg, Johan, 2025. "Complementary bidding and cartel detection: Evidence from Nordic asphalt markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    19. Fischer, Carolyn, 2011. "Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 212-230, January.
    20. Cheng, Harrison, 2001. "Cournot outcome and optimal collusion: an example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 1-8, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.