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Le paradoxe des nouvelles politiques d’insertion

  • Jekaterina Dmitrijeva
  • Florent Fremigacci
  • Yannick L'Horty

Social policies implemented by French departments have significantly evolved since the 2009 reform of the RSA (Revenu de Solidarité Active) minimum income scheme. Designed to promote employability through better assessment of individual obstacles to employment, local programs display paradoxically low participation rates. This study uses an original dataset on a cohort of newly registered RSA recipients to investigate the extent and causes of non-participation in a social program consisting of 15 workshops dealing with potential obstacles to employment. While the global participation rate is estimated to only 13 percent, we are able to distinguish the demand side causes (the behavior of eligible individuals) and those on the supply side (social policy offer) by decomposing the participation process in three stages: the receipt of notification to attend; acceptance; effective enrollment. Our finding is that supply factors play a major role in low participation in social policies.

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Paper provided by TEPP in its series TEPP Research Report with number 2013-08.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:tep:tepprr:rr13-08
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  2. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, 2004. "The Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Evidence from a Prototypical Job Training Program," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 243-298, April.
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  8. Ann Dryden Witte & Magaly Queralt, 2002. "Take-Up Rates and Trade Offs After the Age of Entitlement: Some Thoughts and Empirical Evidence for Child Care Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 8886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Gary S. Becker, 1975. "Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, Second Edition," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck75-1, June.
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